Abstract-The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a powerful signaling protocol that controls communication on the
INTRODUCTION
In today's and future wired or wireless networks, multimedia service is a great importance application class. Especially, the next generation of wireless networks will be based on all-IP architecture. One of the most important protocols supporting multimedia services is the session initiation protocol (SIP) [1] . In 1999, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed the SIP for the IP-based telephony protocol [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Because SIP is a text-based peer-to-peer protocol, it uses Internet protocols such as hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) and simple mail transport protocol (SMTP) [8] . When a user wants to access an SIP service, he/she has to perform an authentication process in order to get various services from the remote server. Therefore, the security of SIP is becoming more important [4] , [6] , [8] and the SIP authentication scheme is the most important issue for SIP. However, the original authentication scheme for SIP does not provide strong security because it is based on the HTTP digest authentication [2] .
The services that are enabled by SIP are equally applicable in the world of mobile and ubiquitous computing. For example, a user registers his/her location with a SIP server and then the server knows if the user is available and where the user can be found. In addition, the location could be home, work, or mobile. Now, SIP has been defined by the 3GPP (the 3rd Generation Partnership Project) as a signal protocol for the third-generation communication system [9] .
Yang et al. [10] pointed out that the procedure of the original SIP authentication scheme based on HTTP digest authentication is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the server spoofing attack. They also proposed a secure authentication scheme for SIP to resist the attacks. However, the computational cost of Yang et al.'s scheme is very high, making it unsuitable for practical applications. To improve the performance, Durlanik et al. [11] proposed an authentication scheme using the elliptic curve cryptography(ECC) [12, 13] . Later, Tsai [14] proposed an efficient nonce-based authentication scheme. Since all the communication messages are encrypted/decrypted by using one-way hash function and XOR operation, its computation cost is low, making it promising for low-power processors. Unfortunately, Arshad et al. [15] found Tsai's scheme [14] was still vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack while. They also demonstrated that Tsai's scheme did not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy [9] . To overcome the weaknesses, Arshad et al. [15] also proposed an improved authentication using ECC for SIP.
In this letter, we show that Arshad et al.'s scheme may suffer from off-line password guessing attack if only one elliptic curve scalar multiplication is required in the generation of password verifier from password. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the review of the Arshad et al.'s scheme. Section 3 discusses the cryptanalysis of Arshad et al.'s scheme.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4.
II. REVIEW OF ARSHAD ET AL.'S SCHEME FOR SIP
In this section, we briefly review Arshad et al.'s nonce-based authentication scheme for SIP [1] . There are two phases in 
B. Authentication phase
If a legal user wants to login into S , he must type his username and PW . All steps of authentication phase, as shown in Fig. 1 , executed as follows. 
Phase 2:
The adversary A then launches the off-line password guessing attack as follows:
1)
A Otherwise, adversary repeat steps 1), 2) and 3) until the correct password is found.
From the above description, we know the adversary can get the password. Therefore, Arshad et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, we have shown that Arshad et al.'s authentication scheme for session initiation protocol is vulnerable to password guessing attack. The analysis shows Arshad et al.'s authentication scheme is not for practical application.
